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This article presents a critique of a number of shortcomings with the technology acceptance model (TAM) and points to 
specific remedies in each case. In addition, I present a model for the purposes of providing a foundation for a paradigm 
shift. The model consists first of a decision making core (goal desire → goal intention → action desire → action intention) 
that is grounded in basic decision making variables/processes of a universal nature. The decision core also contains a 
mechanism for self-regulation that moderates the effects of desires on intentions. Second, added to the decision making 
core are a number of causes and effects of decisions and self-regulatory reasoning, with the aim of introducing potential 
contingent, contextual nuances for understanding decision making. Many of the causal variables here are contained within 
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Introduction 
In this commentary, I attempt to point out limitations with the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and lay the groundwork 
for an alternative approach for studying information technology adoption/acceptance/rejection. Let me begin by disclosing 
that my perspective is largely that of an outsider to the field of information systems (IS). and my approach will be to bring a 
critical eye to research on technology acceptance in this field. At the same time, it should be noted that at one time I had 
one foot in IS research, so to speak, in that I was a co-author on three early articles in the TAM tradition (i.e., Bagozzi, 
Davis, and Warshaw, 1992; Davis, Bagozzi and Warshaw, 1989, 1992) and published a few other technology acceptance 
articles in other fields as well (e.g., Bagozzi,1990; Bagozzi and Lee, 1999a,b; Dabholkar and Bagozzi, 2002; Gaither, et 
al., 1996, 1997). Furthermore, I was privileged to have interacted with Fred Davis when he was a doctoral student at MIT 
and I was on the faculty there, and then again when he and I were faculty members together at the University of Michigan, 
as Fred began his career. Hence, although I am obviously not a disinterested, unbiased commentator, I will attempt to give 
as objective an appraisal of TAM as possible, yet at the same time I do not wish to be perceived as hostile to TAM or Fred 
Davis, his coauthors, or many others contributing to the evolution and validation of TAM. Nevertheless, by necessity and 
design, my commentary points out what I believe to be fundamental problems with TAM and with the current state of the 
field. Indeed, I submit that the field is at the threshold of crisis, if not chaos, in regard to explaining technology acceptance, 
and a paradigm shift is needed if progress is to be made. 
The Legacy of TAM and General Shortcomings 
By any measure, TAM qualifies as a remarkable accomplishment, even reaching the status of a paradigm of sorts. The 
number of citations of Davis et al. (1989) alone is over 700 to date, which is a very high number indeed for an article in an 
applied field. And the stream of research in the TAM tradition is impressive in its volume and scope (Lee, Kozar, and Larsen, 
2003). TAM has stood the test of time by being the leading model for nearly two decades and earning many commentaries 
and the focus of this special journal issue. In sum, the importance and impact of TAM are impressive. 
The main strength of TAM is its parsimony: intentions to use a technology influence usage behavior, and perceived 
usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEU) determine intentions to use. The former linkage makes TAM overlap with 
the theory of reasoned action (TRA) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB); the latter linkages replace the effects of 
attitudes (A) and subjective norms (SN) under the TRA and the effects of A, SN, and perceived behavioral control (PBC) 
under the TPB. Significantly, TAM has consistently outperformed the TRA and TPB in terms of explained variance across 
many studies (e.g., Davis et al., 1989; Venkatesh et al., 2003). 
Parsimony has also been an Achilles’ heel for TAM. It is unreasonable to expect that one model, and one so simple, would 
explain decisions and behavior fully across a wide range of technologies, adoption situations, and differences in decision 
making and decision makers. As with the TRA and TPB, TAM has seemingly seduced researchers into overlooking the fallacy 
of simplicity. That is, in favoring a simple model, researchers have overlooked essential determinants of decisions and 
action, and turned a blind eye to inherent limitations in TAM. 
Nevertheless, nearly from its inception, and accelerating over the course of almost 20 years, researchers have attempted to 
add to TAM. Most of these efforts have, from my point of view, constituted a broadening of TAM in the sense of introducing 
additional predictors for either PU or intentions. Almost no research has deepened TAM in the sense of explaining PU and 
PEU, reconceptualizing existing variables in the model, or introducing new variables explaining how the existing variables 
produce the effects they do. Large gaps exist in TAM in this regard between intentions and behavior and between PU and 
PEU on the one hand and intention on the other; these are topics I will return to below. Likewise, the few attempts that have 
been made, introducing moderators into TAM to qualify the effects of PU and PEU on intentions, have focused on 
demographic variables (e.g., gender, age), experience, or a crude classification into voluntary versus mandatory contexts of 
use (see Figure 3, Venkatesh et al., 2003). The problems with most tests of moderating effects to date are that little 
theoretical insight is provided into the mechanism, or “the why”, behind proposed interaction effects, and a potentially 
infinite list of such moderators exists, making such broadenings of TAM both unwieldy and conceptually impoverished. The 
consideration of moderating variables is one way of deepening any model, but introductions of these should be grounded 
in theory and with an aim toward including policy variables whenever possible. Finally, the bases for PU and PEU, including 
basic and applied determinants, have been given scant attention in the field. Later in this commentary, I will sketch a 
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proposal based on goal-setting that addresses this shortcoming of TAM. But before turning to specific suggestions, I wish to 
mention more directly what the limitations are of TAM. 
Particular Shortcomings with TAM 
Why should we be concerned with the shortcomings of TAM? The study of technology adoption/acceptance/rejection is 
reaching a stage of chaos, and knowledge is becoming increasingly fragmented with little coherent integration. A good 
example is the recently proposed unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT, Venkatesh et al., 2003). The 
exposition of UTAUT is a well-meaning and thoughtful presentation. But in the end we are left with a model with 41 
independent variables for predicting intentions and at least eight independent variables for predicting behavior (I say “at 
least” because there are plausible direct effects not tested by Venkatesh et al., 2003; see Table 17 therein). Even here, 
arguments can be made that important independent variables have been left out, because few of the included predictors 
are fundamental, generic, or universal, and future research is likely to uncover new predictors not subsumable under the 
existing predictors. The IS field risks being overwhelmed, confused, and misled by the growing piecemeal evidence behind 
decision making and action in regard to technology adoption/acceptance/rejection. What is needed is a unified theory 
about how the many splinters of knowledge cohere and explain decision making. Before attempting to provide some 
guidelines and suggestions along these lines, I will summarize what I perceive are the key problems with TAM and hints at 
remedies. 
The problems with TAM are not entirely peculiar to it, but inhere as well in the TRA and the TPB, which should bring pause 
to accepting any proposal suggesting that the TRA and TPB constitute panaceas for the field. For purposes of organization, I 
maintain that the primary shortcomings of TAM (and the TRA and TPB) reside in (1) two critical gaps in the framework, (2) 
the absence of a sound theory and method for identifying the determinants of PU and PEU, as well as other bases for 
decision making, (3) the neglect of group, social, and cultural aspects of decision making, (4) the reliance on naïve and 
over-simplified notions of affect or emotions, and finally (5) the over dependence on a purely deterministic framework 
without consideration of self-regulation processes. 
Two Critical Gaps 
Venkatesh et al. (2003, Figure 1, p. 427) propose three classes of variables and two linkages in their “Basic Concept 
Underlying User Acceptance Models”: individual reactions to using information technology → intentions to use information 
technology → actual use. The critical gaps lie with the proposed linkages. Consider first the intentions–to–actual use 
linkage. Venkatesh et al. (2003, p. 427) state: “The role of intention as a predictor of behavior is critical and has been well-
established in IS and the reference disciplines…” Presumably this crucial linkage rests on the logic espoused by Ajzen and 
Fishbein (1980, p. 41): “From our point of view, intention is the immediate determinant of behavior, and when an 
appropriate measure of intention is obtained it will provide the most accurate prediction of behavior.” 
From my point of view, the intention-behavior linkage is probably the most uncritically accepted assumption in social 
science research in general and IS research in particular. There are three major issues here. First, the models resting on an 
intention → behavior linkage (e.g., TAM, TRA, TPB) treat behavior as a terminal goal and fail to consider that many actions 
are taken not so much as ends in and of themselves but rather as means to more fundamental ends or goals. For example, 
adoption of IT is often for the purpose of more accurately and efficiently storing, processing, and using information than 
that obtained from currently used means. By focusing on use, TAM slights the benefits of use and their actual attainment. 
The use-to-goal-attainment gap is neglected in TAM except as an anticipated belief up-stream in the model. Also more is 
needed in TAM explicitly focusing on end-state goals/objectives of technology use. More on this later. Second, because 
intentions are made prior to taking action, and the gap in time can be large, with many intervening steps needed and 
obstacles occurring, often unanticipated; and because intentions are often ill-formed or incomplete or need to be adjusted 
over time, it is important to consider various psychological and instrumental steps that go on between intention formation 
and action initiation. This is another aspect of the intention-behavior gap. Third, because decision makers often realize that 
impediments and temptations may arise following the decision to take action, they view their situation as one filled with 
uncertainty and in need of putting forth effort in a dynamic way. As a consequence, decision makers often focus on trying to 
adopt an action or acquire a technology, which changes the orientation of decision makers in fundamentally different ways 
than focusing only on behavior, per se (Bagozzi, 1992; Bagozzi and Warshaw, 1990; Bagozzi and Kimmel, 1995; Bagozzi 
and Edwards, 1998). 
What all this really means with regard to technology adoption/acceptance/rejection is that it is important to conceive this as 
a process and one constituted by goal striving (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 1999). In goal striving, intention formation is 
succeeded by planning (e.g., when, where, and how to act instrumentally), overcoming obstacles, resisting temptations, 
monitoring progress to goal achievement, readjusting actions, maintaining effort and willpower, and reassessing and even 
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attainment and are crucial for the successful adoption and use of technology. In other decision contexts, dealing with goal 
striving, my colleagues and I have studied the roles of physical and mental trying (Bagozzi and Edwards, 1998; Taylor, 
Bagozzi, and Gaither, 2001, 2005), how self-efficacy, outcome expectancies, and affect function (Bagozzi and Edwards, 
2000), motivation (Dholakia and Bagozzi, 2002), and planning and plan enactment (Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Basuroy, 
2003; Dholakia, Bagozzi, and Gopinath, 2007). 
The second critical gap in TAM occurs for the linkage between individual reactions to using information and intentions. 
There are many, many reasons for acting that decision makers might take into account in the formation of an intention to 
act. TAM specifies two, the TRA two, and the TPB three direct reasons for acting, but in reality, each of these can be thought 
to be functions of many beliefs (and evaluations). Two broad issues here deserve scrutiny. One concerns the possible, and 
in practice frequently occurring, absence of compelling motivations for acting on putative reasons for acting (Bagozzi, 
1992, 2000, 2006, 2007a). For example, a person can recognize and even accept that PU or attitudes are favorable 
criteria for deciding to act, but have no desire to act and even explicitly decide not to act in the face of these reasons. In 
other words, PU and attitudes need not contain or constitute motives to act for any particular decision maker or for any 
specific situation. A second issue for concern is how multiple reasons for acting or not, which can be considerable in 
number, are reconciled and transformed into a decision or intention to act. 
To address the problems of motivational content in reasons for acting and how the many reasons are translated into a 
specific decision to act, I built upon a leading theory of behavior in the philosophy of action and the philosophy of mind 
literatures, known as the belief-desire model, to form a general, parsimonious motivational mechanism most proximal to 
actual decision making. That is, an action desire is hypothesized to function as an essential mediator between the many 
reasons for acting, on the one hand, and the decision or intention to act on the other hand. The theory behind desires can 
be found in Bagozzi (1992, 2000, 2006, 2007a) and Perugini and Bagozzi (2004a), and some tests of the theory can be 
found in Bagozzi and Kimmel (1995); Bagozzi and Dholakia (2002, 2006 a,b); Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Pearo (2007); 
Dholakia, Bagozzi, and Pearo (2004); Dholakia, Gopinath, and Bagozzi (2005); Dholakia, Gopinath, Bagozzi, and 
Nataraajan (2006); Perugini and Bagozzi (2001, 2004b); and Dholakia et al. (2007). 
Goal-setting 
The determinants of PU and PEU, as well as of A, SN, and PBC, consist of distinct salient beliefs, and under the TRA and 
TPB at least, these beliefs are multiplied by corresponding evaluations or importances and the product terms summed to 
form an overall summary term. For example, the determinants of A consist of the Σbiei, where bi and ei are belief i and 
evaluation i, respectively, for n consequences of acting. Benbasat and Barki (2007) recommend that focus in the future be 
placed on salient beliefs and their role in TAM and TPB, which I echo. However, I definitely recommend that researchers 
abandon the summated multiplicative models so constitutive of the TRA and TPB for four reasons. First, the summated 
models treat all belief-evaluation pairs as equal in importance and obscure the differential contributions of salient beliefs, if 
any, to PU, PEU, A, SN, and PBC. Second, and related to the first point, belief-evaluation representations fail to allow for or 
specify an underlying structure of salient beliefs, such as might exist in human memory. Rather, products of beliefs and 
evaluations are summed to yield a single aggregation expressed as a single number for each decision maker. To the extent 
that knowledge in the form of beliefs is organized in memory in hierarchies or complex patterns, the classic belief-evaluation 
summations may overlook how specific components of knowledge affect PU, PEU, etc. in terms of the processes decision 
makers go through. To regress PU, PEU, etc. on the summative products or even on individual product terms might 
misrepresent how information is used to form PU, PEU, etc. Third, the summative representations do not take into account 
or represent relationships among salient beliefs. Because beliefs can be interconnected causally, with some more vulnerable 
to outside influence than others and more promising as avenues for persuasive communication attempts needed to change 
PU, PEU, etc., it would be better to model and test for causal relationships among beliefs, which are ignored under 
summative models. Finally, because measures of beliefs and evaluations are not ratio scaled, it is necessary to model all 
additive and multiplicative effects in summative models with multiple regression; but this can (1) be unwieldy (because it 
multiplies the number of independent variables), (2) make analyses hypersensitive to measurement error (because product 
terms are less reliable than their individual constituents), and (3) yield a model conceptually different from the one proposed 
by theory (because the multiplicative model is indistinguishable from the additive plus multiplicative model). See Bagozzi 
(1984) and Evans (1991) for discussions of the technical issues here. 
As an aside, there are two ways to conceive of PU, PEU, A, SN, and PBC. One is to treat each of these as summary 
psychological representations and use global measures to operationalize them. For instance, A is one’s overall attitude 
toward an act and is usually measured by summing a small number of evaluative semantic differential items. The summary 
representation conceptualization then can be modeled as a function of individual or summative belief-evaluation product 
terms. This is now the most common interpretation in psychology and applied fields. A second way to conceive of PU, PEU, 
etc. is defined by the summation of belief-evaluation product terms. For example, A ≡ Σbe, where the researcher takes 
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either A or Σbe as the representation of attitude. Researchers have moved away from this conceptualization in recent years 
and instead have accepted that the summary representations are conceptually and empirically distinct from the summated 
product term representations (see for example, Bagozzi, 1981 a, b). 
With the above-mentioned limitations of summated product terms, what to do? In my research, I have conceived of the 
determinants of A, SN, and PBC, not as summated products of beliefs and evaluations, but rather as functions of either 
goals, motives, or values organized hierarchically, depending on the circumstances (Bagozzi, Bergami, and Leone, 2003). 
This approach is especially useful if we conceive of decision making in goal-setting terms. Then goal-setting becomes a 
precursor to goal striving. More specifically, goal-setting → goal desire → goal intention → goal striving. As discussed in 
section 3.1, goal striving consists of action desire → action intention → planning → trying. A qualitative methodology can 
be used to derive goal, motive, or value hierarchies, and the individual goals, motives, or values, plus their linkages, can be 
treated as independent variables predicting PU, PEU, etc. The advantage of such an approach is that it identifies (1) the 
relative efficacy of individual goals, motives, or values, as well as (2) the influence of linkages between them on PU, PEU, 
etc. The former is analogous to declarative knowledge, because it represents factual categories, whereas the latter is 
analogous to procedural knowledge, because it captures if-then deductions or conclusions implicitly held by decision 
makers. For example, in a study of body weight management, SN was found to be a function of one superordinate goal, 
being socially accepted by one’s peers, but 11 inferences based on perceived linkages between goals were found to also 
influence SN: ‘look good’ → ‘happiness’, ‘achievement’ → ‘health’, ‘energy’ → ‘social acceptance’, ‘energy’ → 
‘endurance’, ‘energy’ → ‘feel good’, ‘energy’ → ‘achievement’, ‘fit into clothes’ → ‘social acceptance’, ‘fit into clothes → 
‘save money’, ‘fit into clothes’ → ‘look good’, ‘fit into clothes’ → ‘’self-esteem’, and ‘feel good’ → ‘achievement’ (Bagozzi 
and Edwards, 1998, p. 616). Another advantage of the goal-setting approach is that it gives a situation-specific model of 
decision making as opposed to general approaches. My colleagues and I have applied this goal-setting methodology for 
uncovering salient beliefs, their organization, and their effects in studies of consumer recycling (Bagozzi and  Dabholkar, 
1994), body weight management (Bagozzi and Edwards, 1998), voting for President Clinton (Bagozzi and Dabholkar, 
2000), joining the army (Bagozzi, Bergami, and Leone, 2003), self-regulation of hypertension (Taylor et al., 2006), 
entrepreneur investment decisions (Morandin, Bagozzi, and Bergami, 2006), and brand community participation 
(Morandin, Bagozzi, and Bergami, 2007). 
Group, Cultural, and Social Aspects of Technology Acceptance 
Why is it important to consider group, cultural, or social aspects of technology acceptance? Much of human behavior is not 
best characterized by an individual acting in isolation. To be sure, we sometimes act seemingly as individuals 
spontaneously, deliberatively, or in response to social pressure. But perhaps more often than not we act interpersonally, or 
as agents of organizations, or jointly with others, or in a holistic sense as members of collectivities. Decisions with regard to 
technology acceptance and actual usage are often done collaboratively or with an aim to how they fit in with, or affect, 
other people or group requisites. 
The TAM is conceived largely as a framework for explaining decision making by individual persons. Indeed in a recent 
article, where the “basic concept underlying user acceptance models” is highlighted, it is explicitly stated that decisions and 
usage are initiated by “individual reactions to using information technology” (Venkatesh et al., 2003, Figure 1, p. 427, 
emphasis added). When so-called “social influence processes” have been introduced into TAM, the practice has been to 
treat social influence in the limited senses of either a constraint or force on the decision maker and perceived as originating 
from “other people whose opinions are important to me” (e.g., Venkatesh and Davis, 2000) or as an attempt to “enhance 
one’s … status in one’s social system,” such as a reference group (e.g., Moore and Benbasat, 1991, p. 195). These can be 
important influences on decision making, but it is important to recognize that they apply to a limited sense of social 
behavior, i.e., that related to interpersonal influence and all too often treated in a largely unidirectional sense; empirical 
research with TAM in this regard has found either mixed results or evidence for social influence in only restricted contexts 
(e.g., when social influence, gender, age, and voluntariness interact, see Venkatesh et al., 2003, Table 21). 
It appears that technology acceptance research has not considered group, cultural, or social aspects of decision making 
and usage very much. Four issues here seem apt for technology acceptance. First, it is important to differentiate social 
normative influence from the role of group norms. Kelman (1974) noted that social normative influence is a species of 
compliance and is based on the need for approval, acceptance, or fear of reprisal. This mode of social influence operates 
on people as individuals (a) in relation to others in interpersonal senses, such as between peers, a parent and child, or an 
informal group and one of its members or (b) through the policies, rewards, or sanctions one is subject to as a member in a 
formal group. The role of group norms functions differently from compliance and is obviously situated in a group context. 
This mode of social behavior is close to what Kelman (1974) termed internalization, which refers to acting out of 
congruence between one’s own and a group’s shared values or goals. Internalization occurs with regard to one’s 
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development (e.g., Higgins, 1991; Kochanska, 1993, 1994); internalization also occurs through processes of education, 
training, and indoctrination in organizations, institutions, or collectivities. So-called reference group influence seems to be a 
combination of compliance and internalization processes. 
Compliance and internalization processes operate on and within individuals, respectively, so to speak, and can occur when 
a person sees oneself as an individual but in relationship to either another person or a group. A second broad concern for 
TAM deals with yet another kind of social process relevant to technology acceptance, which is close to what Kelman (1974) 
termed identification. By identification, Kelman meant influence based on a self-defining relationship a person has with 
another person or group. A more group-based interpretation of identification was proposed by Tajfel (1978) who desired to 
account for what he saw to be a fundamentally unique kind of social behavior distinct from intraindividual and interpersonal 
modes of behavior. Tajfel called this social identity and suggested that it has three parts: a cognitive component composed 
of self-awareness of group membership, an affective component consisting of feelings of attachment or belongingness, and 
an evaluative component comprised of a positive or negative value connotation connected to group membership and 
sometimes termed collective or group self-esteem (see Bagozzi and Lee, 2002). 
My colleagues and I have shown how social identity influences decision making in small friendship groups (Bagozzi and 
Lee, 2002; Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006a; Bagozzi, Bergami, Marzocchi and Morandin, 2007), network- and small-group-
based virtual communities (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2002; Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Pearo, 2007; Dholakia et al., 2004), 
open source software user communities (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006b), and recreational chatters and collaborative 
browsing in online environments (Bagozzi, et al., 2006). 
A third issue related to group, cultural, or social aspects of technology acceptance that is neglected by TAM concerns the 
conceptualization and specification of decision making and, indeed, of all variables in TAM. For decision making involving 
two or more people, where decisions involve mutual, shared, or in some other way joint processes, it is necessary to 
respecify intentions. Intentions in TAM might be characterized as personal intentions (or I-intentions) in that they refer to a 
person’s individual decision or plan to achieve a goal or perform an action by him/herself alone (Eagly and Chaiken, 
1993). For example, “I intend to use expert system X to solve a problem I have been working on.” But group and social 
decision making involve what I have termed, based on discussions in philosophy on plural subject theory (Bagozzi 2000a, 
2005), collective intentions (Bagozzi, 2006, 2007a). One kind of collective intention is actually a personal intention to do 
something with a group of people or to contribute to, or do one’s part of, a group activity (e.g., “I intend to take my son 
shopping tomorrow so that we can examine together a replacement for his obsolete computer.”). A qualitatively different 
form of collective intention is what we might call a “we-intention.” A we-intention is a collective intention rooted in a 
person’s self-conception as a member of a particular group (e.g., an organization) or social category (e.g., one’s gender, 
ethnicity, or religious affiliation), and action is conceived as either the group acting as a unit or the person acting as an 
agent of, or with, the group. Such we-intentions exist in two closely related versions. The first is the shared we-intention and 
is expressed in the form, “I intend that our group/we act” (e.g., “I intend that our work group interact tomorrow via the web 
to collaboratively solve an issue recently uncovered by accountants.”). The second version of the we-intention is communal 
and framed in the form, “We (i.e., ‘I and the group to which I belong’) intend to act” (e.g., “We intend to switch decision 
support systems and undergo training with the new system on Monday.”). 
Collective intentions have been studied recently in a number of studies. See Bagozzi and Lee (2002); Bagozzi and Dholakia 
(2002); Dholakia, et al. (2004); Bagozzi, et al. (2006); Bagozzi and Dholakia (2006a, b); and Bagozzi, Dholakia, and 
Pearo (2007). 
A fourth way that group, cultural, or social processes can be integrated into TAM or the TPB is by considering individual 
differences between cultures. For example, people from independent- versus interdependent-based cultures react differently 
in terms of certain cognitive, emotional, or motivational processes (e.g., Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Another individual 
difference variable, which also can be elicited situationally, is regulatory focus (a promotion versus prevention strategic 
orientation), which has been found to moderate the effects of certain variables on evaluations and on decisions (Dholakia et 
al., 2006; Leone et al., 2005). Independent versus interdependent self construals have also been found to interact with 
regulatory focus to influence decisions. 
Emotions 
The role of emotions in technology acceptance has been treated in a rather ad hoc way in extensions of TAM and in other 
treatments of affect in IS. For instance, intrinsic motivation, affect toward use (joy versus sadness emotions), affect (liking for 
a particular behavior), and anxiety toward performing a behavior have been proposed as direct predictors of effort and/or 
performance expectancies and, therefore, are claimed to be indirect determinants of intentions (Venkatesh, 2000; 
Venkatesh et al., 2003, Figure 3). Indeed, affective reactions are considered to be instances of attitudes and thus to not 
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produce effects independent of traditional measures of attitudes by Venkatesh et al. (2003, Table 13). I would argue that 
attitudes, classically construed as evaluative responses, and emotions are distinct phenomena. Further, tests to date that 
included both attitudes and emotions as copredictors of intentions or of antecedents to intentions probably exhibited 
sufficient multicollinearity (in the sense of being more highly correlated among themselves than with intentions or with 
antecedents of intentions treated as dependent variables) so as to obscure, mask, or distort predictions and yield 
indeterminant findings. Equally important, I submit that treatments of affect with respect to technology acceptance have not 
been grounded in theories most appropriate to the decision processes people go through. Instead of developing a theory 
specifying how affect functions at various stages of decision making, the practice has been to take a rather empirical 
approach by adding various measures of affect to TAM or extended TAMs as parallel predictors of both intentions and 
antecedents to intentions. What are needed are specific theories of the effects of emotions tailored to technology 
acceptance. 
A number of recent developments in psychology are worth considering in this regard. One approach is to consider attitudes 
(Bagozzi, Moore, and Leone, 2004) and emotions (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, and Pieters, 1998) as prefactual appraisals of 
achieving and failing to achieve one’s technology use goals. These appraisals, perhaps weighted respectively by 
expectations of success and expectations of failure (Bagozzi and Warshaw, 1990), then function as dynamic determinants of 
intentions (or desires). Unlike the role of attitudes classically conceived (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993), where it is claimed that 
attitudes influence intentions following their retrieval or activation as stored, passive evaluations, prefactual attitudes are 
posited to be dynamic constructions of how a decision maker feels about anticipated effort and outcomes related to a 
personal goal (Bagozzi, 2006; Bagozzi et al., 2004). The decision maker considers his/her goal, thinks about and imagines 
three aspects thereof (achieving the goal, failing to achieve the goal, and striving to achieve the goal), and then expresses 
evaluations (in the case of attitudes) or positive and negative emotions (in the case of affect) of each aspect. The dynamic 
decision making process consists of the sequence of consider-imagine-appraise-decide, hence the label prefactual 
processes. In addition to prefactual processes, which refer to anticipated attitudes or emotions, it has been shown that real-
time anticipatory positive (e.g., hope) and negative (e.g., anxiety) emotions also can initiate decisions to act (Baumgartner 
et al., 2007). 
Prefactual attitudes (including also affect toward means) have been studied with regard to body weight goals (Bagozzi and 
Warshaw, 1990; Bagozzi and Kimmel, 1995; Bagozzi and Edwards, 1998), regulation of hypertension (Taylor, et al., 
2001), and dieting goals (Bagozzi, et al., 2004). Prefactual emotions have been investigated with respect to body weight 
maintenance (Bagozzi et al., 1998), exercising and dieting (Perugini and Bagozzi, 2001), participation in virtual 
communities (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2002; Dholakia et al., 2004; Bagozzi et al., 2007), open source software 
communities (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006b), and brand communities (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006a). In the latter study, 
attitudes, positive anticipated emotions, and negative anticipated emotions all had unique effects on desires enroute to 
influencing intentions. Finally, one investigation of decision making with respect to the upcoming millennium found that 
both anticipated and anticipatory emotions influence decisions (Baumgartner et al., 2007). 
Other promising roles for emotions in explaining technology acceptance can be identified. We already mentioned that 
affective commitment is an essential component of social identity, and a number of studies in group settings demonstrate 
the role of social identity in influencing desires and intentions. Second, the so-called social or self-conscious emotions 
(pride, gratitude, guilt, shame, embarrassment, envy, jealousy) play a key role in self-regulation, as we sketch below 
(Bagozzi, 2006, 2007a). Third, desire can be considered related to emotions and represents a special mode of motivation, 
as we mentioned above. Finally, during attempts at trying to reach a goal, it is likely that emotions stemming from 
appraisals of progress or lack of progress will moderate the effect of trying on goal achievement (see Bagozzi, 2006, 
2007a, for reviews of research in psychology supporting such a possibility). 
Self-Regulation 
A final omission in TAM (and the TPB) is consideration of self-regulatory processes in decision making. TAM is a completely 
deterministic model in the sense that the causes at the foot of each arrow in the model are presumed to inevitably lead to 
the effect at the head of the arrow. That is, when an independent variable increases (decreases), the dependent variable is 
expected to increase (decrease) by some amount to be estimated empirically. The mechanisms governing the dependence 
of an effect on a cause are built into the rationales linking causes to effects. If a moderating variable is hypothesized to 
regulate the impact of an effect on a cause, it too is presumed to operate deterministically, though contingently. The 
discovery of nonsignificant empirical relationships, where theoretical connections are hypothesized, represents a failure to 
sustain the hypotheses. These are necessary implications of deterministic theories, which underlie TAM, TPB, and indeed 
nearly all theories in psychology and the social sciences. Another way of stating the issue is to recognize that TAM, TPB, and 
most other models rest on cognitive laws of information processing and emotional and motivational laws of responding, 
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TAM and other contemporary approaches do not permit human agency, which is rooted in causal powers or the new 
essentialism, to be alternatives or compliments to their specifications. To be sure, the received view in psychology (e.g., 
Wegner, 2003) and in much of philosophy (e.g., Dennett, 2002) is strictly deterministic and predicated on physicalist or 
materialist points of view. By human agency, we mean that a decision maker is capable at times of choosing to act in a way 
that is neither impulsive, compulsive, habitual, coerced, nor bribed, but rather results as an intentional response (Searle, 
1992) to the question, “How shall I act?” Blackburn (1994, p. 9) summarizes the issues here nicely: “[an agent is] one who 
acts. The central problem of agency is to understand the difference between events happening in me or to me, and my 
taking control of events, or doing things.” 
Deterministic theories of behavior explain it as physical processes going on in the brain in the form of either automatic 
reactions to outside stimuli or hard-wired responses following law-like information processing. True self-regulation in an 
agentic sense, by contrast, entails an activation of the will, which operates on felt deterministic urges or desires via 
reasoning processes. 
In my own work, I have attempted to formulate a theory of consumer behavior and action whose main processes are 
deterministic, but at the same time can, under certain conditions, come under control of self-regulatory input (e.g., Bagozzi 
1992, 2000b, 2005, 2006, 2007a). I turn to a skeleton representation of this theory hereafter. 
Foundation for a New Paradigm 
A unified approach to understanding and explaining technology adoption/acceptance/rejection is needed and, in 
particular, one that aims for comprehensive questions and answers. My proposal for consideration is to begin by specifying 
a common core of basic variables and processes that are universal in scope, or at least approach universality. Let us call 
this common core, the technology user acceptance decision making core (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The Decision Making Core 
 
The heart of the decision making core consists of goal desire → goal intention → action desire → action intention. These 
processes and their causes or constraints (labeled A and B in the figure) and their effects (D) constitute fully deterministic 
processes. Moreover, these processes capture the basic stages in decision making, bridging goal-setting (A) and goal-
striving (D), making overall goal-directed behavior the center of focus for user acceptance. In somewhat different forms, 
similar goal-directed behavior models have arisen in psychology (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1996), organization behavior (e.g., 
Locke and Latham, 2002), marketing (Bagozzi, 1992, 2006, 2007a; Bagozzi and Dholakia, 1999; Bagozzi, Dholakia, and 
Basuroy, 2003; Dholakia, Bagozzi, and Gopinath, 2007), and such applied areas as health behavior and communication 
research. The decision making core is intended to represent fundamental processes of a universal kind in the sense of 
addressing essential decision making processes that occur in most, if not all, user acceptance situations. 
To briefly point to various causes and effects linked to variables in the decision making core, I offer the following. Here it is 
recognized that there are many causes and effects that in any particular case require the development of contingent theories 
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tailored to those cases and, therefore, drawing upon only the most critical variables and processes connected to the 
decision core. In this way, we suggest that it is important to specify that which is basic (the decision core) and that which is 
contextual (specific instances in A, B, C, and D applicable to the problem context at hand).  
The causes under A are suggested to inhere in goal setting activities as expressed in hierarchical, superordinant goals, 
values, or motives leading to the formation of a focal goal, such as adoption of a particular technology (Bagozzi, Bergami, 
and Leone, 2003). Additional candidate causes in A, depending on the situation, include positive and negative anticipated 
and anticipatory emotions (Bagozzi et al., 1998; Baumgartner et al., 2007); affect toward the possible means of goal 
pursuit (Bagozzi and Edwards, 2000; Bagozzi and Warshaw, 1990); PU; PEU; relative advantage (Moore and Benbarat, 
1991), job fit, attitudes toward success, failure, and the process of goal pursuit (Bagozzi and Warshaw, 1990); and 
outcome expectancies (expectations of success and of failure, Bagozzi and Warshaw, 1990). The causes under B entail 
such instances as group norms, subjective norms, social identity (Bagozzi and Lee, 2002), effort expectancy, PBC, and 
attitudes toward the act. The effects of decision making (D in Figure 1) consist of planning, plan enactment, trying to reach 
a goal, monitoring progress, evaluating progress and its relationship to planning, goal desire, goal intention, action desire, 
action intention, overcoming impediments, resisting temptations, deflecting goal pursuit, goal realization/failure, and 
feedback and its appraisal (Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Basuroy, 2003; Dholakia et al., 2007). 
So far everything discussed with respect to the decision core and its linkages entails deterministic processes. Human agency 
involves, I claim, an additional feature of decision making that is more executive in function and is labeled self-regulation in 
Figure 1. Much of human behavior gives the illusion of control (Wegner, 2002) or else is automatic with little or no thought 
and application of action. By automatic I mean we have beliefs, values, subgoals, etc. that drive our felt desires, and we act 
more or less straightaway in response to our felt desires. However, under some circumstances or for some decision makers, 
people become aware of their desires (or lack of desire) and examine them with an aim to engage in practical decision 
making. 
There are two board categories of self-regulation: reflectivity and reflexivity (Bagozzi, 2007a). Reflective self-regulation, for 
me, means the active imposition of personal moral or self-evaluative standards to a felt or possible goal desire or action 
desire (Bagozzi, 2006). That is, decision makers evaluate their desires and then reason and decide whether they want to 
have or want to not have the desires they experience and scrutinize. They do this in such a way as to cancel, override, 
modify, or postpone further consideration or implementation of the desire to act. More specifically, I propose that, when 
thinking about one’s desire to act (or one’s goal desire), a decision maker asks him/herself such questions as the following: 
Am I the kind of person who should have a desire? Am I the kind of person who acts on this kind of desire? Is the desire 
consistent with the kind of person I wish to be? Will acting on this desire lead to personal flourishing? What effect will acting 
on this desire have on other people important to me, other people whom I might not even know, or social welfare writ 
large? In answering the question what to decide or do, the decision maker brings to bear reasons for deciding or for acting 
or not (e.g., duty, obligations, or other personal standards and social requisites). Such reasons both justify and motivate the 
decision or action. Thus self-regulatory reasoning comes to interact with our desires to influence our intentions and through 
intentions action. In a parallel manner, I suggest that a decision maker can reflect upon his/her lack of felt desire for a goal 
or to act in a particular decision context. Here the person considers whether to accept, embrace, or construct a desire for a 
goal or to act; questions analogous to those noted above could be posed self-reflectively with regard to self-perceived lack 
of felt desire (e.g., “Is my not feeling a desire to act consistent with the type of person I wish to be?”). 
So, self-regulation serves to moderate the effects, if any, of desires on intentions, and the processes are reflective ones 
based on reasoning. Note that desires, intentions, and their antecedents are empirical in the sense that they can be 
measured or manipulated as physical phenomena. The reasoning processes in self-regulation, by contrast, are largely 
composed of ideals and constitute transcendental-type concepts, although we leave open the possibility that some or at 
least part of such reasoning processes can be represented empirically as well. Thus decision makers can exercise a certain 
degree of control over their desires and intentions. Left by themselves, desires operate deterministically to influence 
intentions. But by the willful imposition of self-evaluative standards, one can stop the effect of a desire on decisions or 
create or activate a desire to influence intentions where no such desire currently exists. Note further that self-regulation can 
also occur reflexively. That is, learned values, dispositions, traits, virtues, and vices can function as moderators of the effects 
of desires on intentions (Bagozzi, 2007a; Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007). An example would be a virtuous decision maker 
deciding seemingly spontaneously to resist his/her personal desire to purchase a technology that harms the environment. 
Here the virtue is presumably internalized and has been operating for a while as a personal policy that is activated upon 
being confronted with the possibility of adopting a new technology. Finally, I wish to stress that another way that people self-
regulate their desires is by being thankful or expressing their gratitude for that which they have, by limiting their wants 
through regular self-examination, by consciously resisting the persuasive effects of advertising, peer pressure, and the larger 
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The final aspect of the decision core I wish to briefly comment upon is depicted in Figure 1 as C. The processes represented 
by C impinge upon, constrain, or capture the development of self-regulation. Elsewhere I have pointed out three broad 
classes of such processes: social or self-conscious emotions; social identity; and such feelings for others as caring, love, 
and empathy (Bagozzi, 2006, 2007a). Note that the processes under C constitute deterministic processes, and thus self-
regulation is affected, in part at least, by such processes. Again, we leave open the possibility that some aspects of self-
regulation are transcendental and not completely explicable deterministically. 
Conclusion 
TAM is a remarkable model and has had an incredible effect on empirical research for a long time. But it seems to have 
reached a turning point. On the one hand, it is too simple and leaves out important variables and processes. On the other 
hand, recent extensions of TAM (e.g., the UAUT) have been a patchwork of many largely unintegrated and uncoordinated 
abridgements. 
In this paper, I attempted to point out the limitations of TAM and point the reader to new developments in psychology and 
applied disciplines in this regard. I also attempted to propose a dual approach that rests first on specifying fundamental 
psychological processes of decision making, grounded in universal principles, and second on providing a basis for 
delineating contingent, contextual causes and effects of the basic decision making core. This approach results in deepening 
the theory of technology use acceptance, while suggesting fruitful avenues for better understanding how, when, and why 
decisions are made in various technology applications. 
A couple of topics I was not able to address are the broader role of social processes and methodology. I presented some 
ideas on how the heretofore construed individualistic conception of intentions can be treated in a social sense. A parallel 
approach could be taken with the other variables in TAM, TPB, or the model I proposed (see Bagozzi, 2000a, 2005). 
Methodology is important to consider because it so closely interfaces with theory and theory testing and interpretation, and 
because how we study a phenomenon constrains how we think about it. I am not sure, but I get the sense that little 
methodological pluralism exists in the IS area and that most phenomena have been studied by multiple regression or PLS. 
We have a parallel problem in my field in that ANOVA and SEMs are the primary methods of choice, with some use of 
multiple regression too. Much of psychology is even narrower and relies on ANOVA as the main method of choice. It is no 
wonder then that theories and knowledge evolve so narrowly in fields, and coupled with the inevitable conflicts, censorship, 
and gate-keeper effects all fields undergo in the review process, we see a reluctance to discard that which has grown stale, 
to borrow knowledge from other areas, and to be open to new ideas within our own fields. Finally a specific methodological 
caution to leave the reader with is to be wary of using formative indicators, except in very special cases (Bagozzi, 2007b). 
References 
 
Bagozzi, R.P. “An Examination of the Validity of Two Models of Attitude,” Multivariate Behavioral Research, 16, (July 
1981a), 323-359. 
Bagozzi, R.P., “Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior: A Test of Some Key Hypotheses,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 41 (1981b), 607-627. 
Bagozzi, R.P. “Expectancy-value Attitude Models: An Analysis of Critical Measurement Issues,” International Journal of 
Research in Marketing, 1, 1984, 295-310. 
Bagozzi, R.P. “Buyer Behavior Models for Technological Products and Services: A Critique and Proposal,” in W.J. Johnston 
(ed.), Advances in Telecommunications Management, vol. 2, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1990, 43-69. 
Bagozzi, R.P., “The Self-Regulation of Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior,” Social Psychology Quarterly, 55, 1992, 178-
204. 
Bagozzi, R.P. “On the Concept of Intentional Social Action in Consumer Behavior,” Journal of Consumer Research, 2000a, 
27, 388-396. 
Bagozzi, R.P. “The Poverty of Economic Explanations of Consumption and an Action Theory Alternative,” Managerial and 
Decision Economics, 2000b, 21, 95-109. 
Bagozzi, R.P., “Socializing Marketing,” Marketing: Journal of Research in Management, 2 (2005), 101-110. 
Bagozzi, R.P. “Consumer Action: Automaticity, Purposiveness, and Self-Regulation,” in N.K. Malhotra (ed.), Review of 
Marketing Research, vol. 2, Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2006, 3-42. 
Bagozzi, R.P., “Explaining Consumer Behavior and Consumer Action: From Fragmentation to Unity,” Seoul Journal of 
Business, (2007a). 
Bagozzi, R.P., “On the Meaning of Formative Measurement and How it Differs from Reflective Measurement,” Psychological 
Methods,    (2007b). 
Bagozzi, R.P., H. Baumgartner, and R. Pieters, “Goal-Directed Emotions,” Cognition and Emotion, 12 (1998), 1-16. 
 
Issue 4 Volume 8 Article 7 
253 
Bagozzi, R.P., M. Bergami, and L. Leone, “Hierarchical Representation of Motives in Goal-setting,” Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 2003, 88, 915-943. 
Bagozzi, R.P., M. Bergami, G.L. Marzocchi, and G. Morandin, “Customers are member of Organizations too: Assessing 
Foci of Identification in a Brand Community,” Unpublished working paper, The University of Michigan, 2007. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and P.A. Dabholkar, “Consumer Recycling Goals and Their Effect on Decisions to Recycle: A Means End 
Chain Analysis,” Psychology and Marketing, 11, 1994, 313-340. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and P.A. Dabholkar, “Discursive Psychology: An Alternative Conceptual Foundation to Means-End Chain 
Theory,” Psychology and Marketing, 2000, 17, 535-586 (lead article). 
Bagozzi, R.P., F.D. Davis, and P.R. Warshaw. “Development and Test of a Theory of Technological Learning and Usage,” 
Human Relations, 45, 1992, 659-686. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and U. Dholakia, “Goal-setting and Goal-striving in Consumer Behavior,” Journal of Marketing, 63, 1999, 
19-32. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and U.M. Dholakia, “Intentional Social Action in Virtual Communities,” Journal of Interactive Marketing, 
2002, 16, 2-21 (lead article). 
Bagozzi, R.P. and U.M. Dholakia, “Antecedents and Purchase Consequences of Customer Participation in Small Group 
Brand Communities,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, 2006a, 23, 45-61. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and U.M. Dholakia, “Open Source Software User Communities: A Study of Participation in Linux User 
Groups”, Management Science, 2006b, 52, 1099-1115. 
Bagozzi, R.P., U.M. Dholakia, and S. Basuroy, “How Effortful Decisions Get Enacted: The Motivating Role of Decision 
Processes, Desires, and Anticipated Emotions,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2003, 16, 273-295. 
Bagozzi, R.P., U.M. Dholakia, and A. Mookerjee, “Individual and Group Bases of Social Influence in Online Environments, 
Media Psychology, 8 (2006), 95-126. 
Bagozzi, R.P., U.M. Dholakia, and L.R. Klein Pearo, “Antecedents and Consequences of Online Social Interactions,” Media 
Psychology, 9 (2007), 77-114. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and E.A. Edwards, “Goal Setting and Goal Pursuit in the Regulation of Body Weight,” Psychology and Health, 
13, 1998, 593-621. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and E.A. Edwards, “Goal-striving and the Implementation of Goal Intentions in the Regulation of Body 
Weight,” Psychology and Health, 2000, 15, 255-270. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and S.K. Kimmel, “A Comparison of Leading Theories for the Prediction of Goal-directed Behaviors,” British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 1995, 437-461. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and K-H. Lee, “Resistance to Innovations: Psychological and Social Origins,” Seoul National University 
Journal of Business, 33, 1999, 182-204. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and K-H. Lee, “Consumer Acceptance of and Resistance to Innovations: Decision Making and Implementation 
Processes,” Advances in Consumer Research, 26, 1999, 218-225. 
Bagozzi, R.P., D.J. Moore, and L. Leone, “Self-Control and the Self-Regulation of Dieting Decisions: The Role of Prefactual 
Attitudes, Subjective Norms, and Resistance to Temptation,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 26, 2 & 3, (2004), 
199-213. 
Bagozzi, R.P. and P.R. Warshaw, “Trying to Consume,” Journal of Consumer Research, 17, 1990, 127-140. 
Baumgartner, H., R. Pieters, and R.P. Bagozzi, “Future-Oriented Emotions: Conceptualization and Behavioral Effects,” 
Unpublished Working Paper, University of Michigan, 2007. 
Benbarat, I. and H. Barki, “Quo Vadis TAM,” Journal of the Association for Information Systems, forthcoming 2007. 
Blackburn, S., The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Dabholkar, P.A. and R.P. Bagozzi, “An Attitudinal Model of Technology-Based Self-Service: Moderating Effects of Consumer 
Traits and Situational Factors,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 2002, 184-201. 
Davis, F.D., R.P. Bagozzi, and P.R. Warshaw. “User Acceptance of Computer Technology: A Comparison of Two 
Theoretical Models,” Management Science, 35, 1989, 982-1003. 
Davis, F.D., R.P. Bagozzi, and P.R. Warshaw. “Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation to use Computers in the Workplace,” 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22, 1992, 1111-1132. 
Dennett, D., Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown, 1991. 
Dholakia, U.M. and R.P. Bagozzi, “Mustering Motivation to Enact Decisions: How Decision Process Characteristics Influence 
Goal Realization,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2002, 15, 167-188. 
Dholakia, U.M., R.P. Bagozzi, and L.R. Klein Pearo, “A Social Influence Model of Consumer Participation in Network- and 
Small-Group-Based Virtual Communities,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, 2004, 21, 241-263. 
Dholakia, U.M., R.P. Bagozzi, and M. Gopinath, “How Formulating Implementation Plans and Remembering Past Actions 
Facilitate the Enactment of Effortful Decisions,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, (2007), 
Dholakia, U.M., M. Gopinath, and R.P. Bagozzi, “The Role of Desires in Sequential Impulsive Choices,” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2005, 98, 179-194. 
Dholakia, U.M., M. Gopinath, R.P. Bagozzi, and R. Nataraajan. “The Role of Regulatory Focus in the Experience and Self-




Issue 4 Volume 8 Article 7 
Eagly, A.H. and S. Chaiken, The Psychology of Attitudes. Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, Fort Worth, TX, 1993. 
Evans, M.G., “The Problem of Analyzing Multiple Composites,” American Psychologist, 46 (1991), 6-15. 
Gaither, C.A., R.P. Bagozzi, F.J. Ascione, and D.M. Kirking, “A Reasoned Action Approach to Physicians’ Utilization of Drug 
Information Sources,” Pharmaceutical Research, 13, 1996, 1291-1298. 
Gaither, C.A., R.P. Bagozzi, F.J. Ascione, and D.M. Kirking, “The Determinants of Physician Attitudes and Subjective Norms 
toward Drug Information Sources: Modification and Test of the Theory of Reasoned Action,” Pharmaceutical Research, 
14, 1997, 1298-1308. 
Gollwitzer, P.M., “The Volitional Benefits of Planning,” Pp. 287-312 in P.M. Gollwitzer and J.A. Bargh, eds., The 
Psychology of Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to Behavior, New York: Guilford, 1996. 
Higgins, E.T., “Development of Self-Regulatory and Self-Evaluative Processes: Costs, Benefits, and Tradeoffs,” Pp. 125-166 
in Self Processes and Development, vol. 23, M.R. Gunnar and L.A. Sroufe, eds., Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1991. 
Higgins, E.T., “Promotion and Prevention: Regulatory Focus as a Motivational Principle,” Pp. 1-46, Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 30, 1998, New York: Academic Press. 
Kelman, H.C., “Further Thoughts on the Processes of Compliance, Identification, and internalization,” Pp. 126-171 in 
Perspectives on Social Power; J.T. Tedeschi, ed., Chicago: Aldine, 1974. 
Kochanska, G., “Toward a Synthesis of Parental Socialization and Child Temperament in Early Development of 
Conscience,” Child Development, 64 (1993), 325-347. 
Kochanska, G., “Beyond Cognition: Expanding the Search for the Early Roots of Internalization and Conscience,” 
Developmental Psychology, 30 (1994), 20-22. 
Lee, Y., K.A. Kozar, and K.R.T. Larsen, “The Technology Acceptance Model: Past, Present, and the Future,” 
Communications of the AIS, 12 (2003), 752-780. 
Leone, L., M. Perugini, and R.P. Bagozzi, “Emotions and decision making: Regulatory focus moderates the influence of 
anticipated emotions on action evaluations,” Cognition and Emotion, 19, 8 (2005), 1175-1198. 
Locke, E.A. and G.P. Latham, “Building a Practically Useful Theory of Goal-Setting and Motivation,” American Psychologist, 
13, 1 (2002), 23-29. 
Markus, H. and S. Kitayama, “Culture and Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation,” Psychological 
Review, 98, 1991, 224-253. 
Moore, G.C. and I. Benbasat, “Development of an Instrument to Measure the Perceptions of Adopting an Information 
Technology Innovation,” Information Systems Research, 2, 3 (September 1991), 192-222. 
Morandin, G., M. Bergami, and R.P. Bagozzi (2006). “The Hierarchical Cognitive Structure of Entrepreneur Motivation 
Toward Private Equity Financing,” Venture Capital, 8, 3 (July 2006), 253-271. 
Morandin, G., R.P. Bagozzi, and M. Bergami, “Motivation to Participate in Brand Communities: Disclosing and Enacting 
Cognitive Schemes,” unpublished working paper, University of Michigan, 2007. 
Perugini, M., and R.P. Bagozzi, “The Role of Desires and Anticipated Emotions in Goal-Directed Behaviors: Broadening and 
Deepening the Theory of Planned Behavior,” British Journal of Social Psychology, 40(2001), 79-98. 
Perugini, M. and R.P. Bagozzi, “An Alternative View of Pre-volitional Processes in Decision Making: Conceptual Issues and 
Empirical Evidence,” in G. Haddock and G.R. Maio (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on the Psychology of Attitudes, 
Hove, UK: Psychology Press, 2004a, 169-201. 
Perugini, M. and R.P. Bagozzi, “The Distinction between Desires and Intentions,” European Journal of Social Psychology, 
2004b, 34, 69-84. 
Searle, J.D., The Rediscovery of Mind, MA: MIT Press, 1992. 
Sekerka, L.E. and R.P. Bagozzi, “Moral Courage in the Workplace: Moving to and from the Desire and Decision to Act,” 
Business Ethics: A European Review, (2007). 
Tajfel, H., “Social Categorization, Social Identity, and Social Comparison,” pp. 61-67 in Differentiation Between Social 
Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, H. Tajfel, ed., London: Academic Press, 1978. 
Taylor, S.D., R.P. Bagozzi, and C.A. Gaither, “Gender Differences in the Self-regulation of Hypertension,” Journal of 
Behavioral Medicine, 2001, 24, 469-487. 
Taylor, S.D., R.P. Bagozzi, and C.A. Gaither, “Decision Making and Effort in the Self-Regulation of Hypertension: Testing 
Two Competing Theories,” British Journal of Health Psychology, 10 (2005), 505-530. 
Taylor, S.D., Bagozzi, R.P., Gaither, C.A., and K.A. Jamerson, “The Bases of Goal Setting in the Self-Regulation of 
Hypertension,” Journal of Health Psychology, 11 (2006), 141-162. 
Venkatesh, V., “Determinants of Perceived Ease of Use: Integrating Perceived Behavioral Control, Computer Anxiety and 
Enjoyment into the Technology Acceptance Model,” Information Systems Research, 11, 4 (2000), 342-365. 
Venkatesh, V. and F.D. Davis, “A Theoretical Extension of the Technology Acceptance Model: Four Longitudinal Field 
Studies,” Management Science, 46, 2 (February 2000), 186-204. 
Venkatesh, V., M.G. Morris, G.B. Davis, and F.D. Davis, “User Acceptance of Information Technology: Toward a Unified 
View,” MIS Quarterly, 27, 3 (September 2003), 425-478. 








Case Western Reserve University, USA 
 
Senior Editors 
Izak Benbasat  University of British Columbia, Canada Robert Fichman  Boston College, USA 
Varun Grover Clemson University, USA Rudy Hirschheim  Louisiana State University, USA 
Juhani Iivari  University of Oulu, Finland Elena Karahanna  University of Georgia, USA 
Robert Kauffman  University of Minnesota, USA Frank Land London School of Economics, UK 
Bernard C.Y. Tan National University of Singapore, 
Singapore 
Yair Wand  University of British Columbia, 
Canada 
Editorial Board 
Ritu Agarwal  University of Maryland, USA Steve Alter University of San Francisco, USA 
Michael Barrett University of Cambridge, UK Cynthia Beath  University of Texas at Austin, USA 
Anandhi S. Bharadwaj Emory University, USA Francois Bodart University of Namur, Belgium 
Marie-Claude Boudreau University of Georgia, USA Tung Bui University of Hawaii, USA 
Yolande E. Chan  Queen's University, Canada Dave Chatterjee University of Georgia, USA 
Roger H. L. Chiang University of Cincinnati, USA Wynne Chin University of Houston, USA 
Ellen Christiaanse  University of Amsterdam, Nederland Guy G. Gable Queensland University of 
Technology, Australia 
Dennis Galletta University of Pittsburg, USA Hitotora Higashikuni Tokyo University of Science, Japan 
Matthew R. Jones University of Cambridge, UK Bill Kettinger University of South Carolina, USA 
Rajiv Kohli Colleage of William and Mary, USA Chidambaram Laku University of Oklahoma, USA 
Ho Geun Lee Yonsei University, Korea Jae-Nam Lee Korea University 




Stockholm School of Economics, 
Sweden 
Ann Majchrzak University of Southern California, USA Ji-Ye Mao Remnin University, China 
Anne Massey Indiana University, USA Emmanuel Monod Dauphine University, France 
Eric Monteiro 
 
Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology, Norway 
Jonathan Palmer College of William and Mary, USA 
B. Jeffrey Parsons 
 
Memorial University of Newfoundland, 
Canada 
Paul Palou University of California, Riverside, 
USA 








University of Rochester, USA 
Sudha Ram University of Arizona, USA Balasubramaniam Ramesh Georgia State University, USA 
Suzanne Rivard Ecole des Hautes Etudes 
Commerciales, Canada 
Timo Saarinen Helsinki School of Economics, 
Finland 
Rajiv Sabherwal University of Missouri, St. Louis, USA Olivia Sheng University of Utah, USA 
Ananth Srinivasan University of Auckland, New Zealand Katherine Stewart University of Maryland, USA 
Kar Yan Tam 
 
University of Science and Technology, 
Hong Kong 
Dov Te'eni Tel Aviv University, Israel 
Viswanath Venkatesh University of Arkansas, USA Richard T. Watson University of Georgia, USA 
Bruce Weber  London Business School, UK Richard Welke Georgia State University, USA 
Youngjin Yoo Temple University, USA Kevin Zhu University of California at Irvine, USA 
Administrator
Eph McLean  AIS, Executive Director Georgia State University, USA 
J. Peter Tinsley Deputy Executive Director Association for Information Systems, USA 
Reagan Ramsower Publisher Baylor University
 
